♣ 'Love in the Time of Consequentialism.' Noûs, advance version online here.
This paper develops a neutral value-based theory of reasons of partiality.
♣ 'There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.' Mind, advance version online here.
This paper argues that actions and affective attitudes admit of different kinds of normative support. There are reasons for actions but not for affective attitudes. Affective attitudes are instead fitting or unfitting.
♣ 'The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.' Ergo, vol. 3, no. 9, 2016.
This paper develops the value-based theory of reasons in detail and some theoretical arguments in its favour, including its competency accounting for weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons talk.
♣ 'Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons (or: On Whether to Assassinate Pelé)' Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 6, 2016.
This paper starts with a puzzle for Act Consequentialism arising from cases involving the promotion of virtue, and uses this puzzle to motivate a systematic restriction on the separability of reasons.
♣ 'An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons' (with Errol Lord), Weighing Reasons, OUP, 2016.
This paper argues that all sensible ethical theories need weighted notions. The paper proceeds to offer a critical introduction to the central theoretical and substantive issues concerning weight.
♣ 'Markets, Interpersonal Practices, and Signal Distortion' with Brookes Brown. Under review - please email for draft.
This paper defends a broadly consequentialist version of the semiotic objection to market expansionism.
♣ 'Overlapping Reasons' with Justin Snedegar. Under review - please email for draft.
This paper presents a new puzzle for reasons fundamentalism that provides support for 'bottom-up' ethical theories (like value-based and desire-based theories).
♣ 'Morals and Motives for Consequentialists.' Please email for draft.
This paper argues that caring-based consequentialism vindicates a range of insights from Williams, Wolf, Stocker, Adams, and Railton from the 1970s and 1980s.
♣ 'Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory' (with Jack Woods).
Ergo, volume 4, number 14, 2017
This paper argues against a prominent class of model theoretic characterisations of Hume's dictum, focussing on the versions defended by Daniel Singer (2015) and Gillian Russell and Greg Restall (2010).
♣ 'The Autonomy of Ethics' The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, 2017
This paper discusses the prospects for logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic characterisations of the autonomy of ethics.
♣ 'Grounding the Autonomy of Ethics.' Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10, 2015
This paper criticises broadly logical characterisations of the autonomy of ethics, and motivates a metaphysical alternative, based on the thesis that no non-ethical facts fully ground any ethical facts.
♣ 'The Belief Game' (with Jack Woods). Please email for draft.
This paper defends a two-level account of epistemic normativity that vindicates both evidentialism and pragmatism. One upshot is that all reasons for belief are of the 'wrong' kind.
♣ 'Defending David Lewis' Modal Reduction.' Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, 2013
David Lewis attempted to reduce modal notions to non-modal notions. This paper argues, against a range of recent critics, that he succeeds on his own terms.
♣ Review of Andrew Reisner and Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 2016
♣ Review of Scanlon's Being Realistic About Reasons in the Times Literary Supplement, 28 November 2014
Please feel free to email me for drafts of anything not presently online.
Kindly quote from published rather than pre-published versions where possible.
Weighing Reasons (Oxford University Press)
Co-edited with Errol Lord
Available at your local bookstore
And on Oxford Scholarship Online
Here's a review by Jussi Suikkanen in NDPR
Here's a review by Jonathan Way in EJP
Here's a review by Justin Snedegar in Ethics
Here's a review by Krister Bykvist in Analysis