Kindly quote from published rather than pre-published versions where possible. Feel free to email me for drafts of anything not presently online.
Work in Progress
♣ 'Alienation and Market Exchange.'
...argues that an important kind of market exchange is necessarily alienating.
♣ 'Caring Consequentialism'.
...argues that a caring-based consequentialist theory is the best placed to honour a range of insights from Williams, Wolf, Stocker, Adams, and Railton.
♣ 'All Genuine Reasons for Belief are the Wrong Kind of Reasons for Belief' (with Jack Woods).
...defends a two-level account of epistemic normativity that aims to vindicate both evidentialism and pragmatism.
♣ 'Explaining Overlapping Reasons' with Justin Snedegar.
...discusses some challenges for reasons fundamentalism arising from the distinction between reasons and contributors.
Published or Forthcoming
♣ 'Markets, Interpersonal Practices, and Signal Distortion' with Brookes Brown. Forthcoming in Philosophers' Imprint.
...develops a new semiotic argument for an ethical limit on markets.
♣ 'Love in the Time of Consequentialism.' Noûs, advance version online here.
...develops a neutral value-based theory of reasons of partiality.
♣ 'There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.' Mind, advance version online here.
...argues that actions and affective attitudes admit of different kinds of normative support. There are reasons for actions but not for affective attitudes. Affective attitudes are instead fitting or unfitting.
♣ 'Model Theory, Hume's Dictum, and the Priority of Ethical Theory' (with Jack Woods).
Ergo, volume 4, number 14, 2017
...argues against a prominent class of model theoretic characterisations of Hume's dictum, focussing on the versions defended by Daniel Singer (2015) and Gillian Russell and Greg Restall (2010).
♣ 'The Autonomy of Ethics' The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, 2017
...discusses the prospects for logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic characterisations of the autonomy of ethics.
♣ 'The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.' Ergo, vol. 3, no. 9, 2016.
...develops the value-based theory of reasons in detail and some theoretical arguments in its favour, including its competency accounting for weight, transmission, overlap, and the promiscuity of reasons talk.
♣ 'Extrinsic Value and the Separability of Reasons (or: On Whether to Assassinate Pelé)' Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 6, 2016.
...starts with a puzzle for Act Consequentialism arising from cases involving the promotion of virtue, and uses this puzzle to motivate a systematic restriction on the separability of reasons.
♣ 'An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons' (with Errol Lord), Weighing Reasons, OUP, 2016.
...argues that all sensible ethical theories need weighted notions. The paper proceeds to offer a critical introduction to the central theoretical and substantive issues concerning weight.
♣ 'Grounding the Autonomy of Ethics.' Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10, 2015
...criticises broadly logical characterisations of the autonomy of ethics, and motivates a metaphysical alternative, based on the thesis that no non-ethical facts fully ground any ethical facts.
♣ 'Defending David Lewis' Modal Reduction.' Philosophical Studies, vol. 166, 2013
...argues that David Lewis attempted to reduce modal notions to non-modal notions succeeds on his own terms.
♣ Review of Andrew Reisner and Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 2016
♣ Review of Scanlon's Being Realistic About Reasons in the Times Literary Supplement, 28 November 2014
Weighing Reasons (Oxford University Press)
Co-edited with Errol Lord
Available at your local bookstore
And on Oxford Scholarship Online
Here's a review by Jussi Suikkanen in NDPR
Here's a review by Jonathan Way in EJP
Here's a review by Justin Snedegar in Ethics
Here's a review by Krister Bykvist in Analysis